Mobile, protected and expeditionary armored vehicles were crucial to the Army’s success in several World War II campaigns, Graham argues, citing as examples the campaigns in Sicily, Leyte and Luzon.ĭuring the Sicily campaign in the summer of 1943, when Allied forces invaded Sicily and took it from the Axis powers, a platoon of tanks from the 2nd Armored Division “significantly contributed to the defeat of the Axis counterattack,” the paper says. “However, this limited focus runs contrary to the U.S. “In the popular imagination, amphibious operations are dominated by the initial assault or landing ,” Graham writes. Instead, the Army should reenergize its doctrine, training and organization around amphibious operations and, specifically, the role of armor within them, with the goal of ensuring the “future of the joint force combined arms landing team,” Graham writes. “While the Army lacks the doctrinal responsibility for amphibious operations, it should not and cannot abdicate its responsibility to consider or conduct amphibious operations as part of the joint force,” writes Graham, an active-duty armor officer with combat experience in Afghanistan who currently is a student at the School of Advanced Military Studies. Matthew Graham writes in “Tanks in the Surf: Maintaining the Joint Combined Arms Landing Team.” The role of the Army’s armored force will only grow as the Marine Corps phases out its tanks, Maj. ![]()
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